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The number of AIDS cases continues to increase in the United
States. The disease's causative agent, the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, HIV, appears to have infected an additional number of asympto-
matic people. Both the disease and the infection are shrouded with
misinformation and misunderstanding. The public reaction is that of
fear and discrimination against both the infected and the ill. Blood
tests exist for the detection of antibodies to the virus. There is
tremendous pressure from the public to use the virus antibody tests,
originally invented to screen the nation's blood supply, to screen
the infected from the uninfected. The danger is that the results of the
tests will be misused.
This paper examines HIV antibody testing, its meaning, and the legal
protections available to prevent unwarranted disclosure. Legal protections
include federal statutes, the United States Constitution as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court and the appellate courts, state constitutional
law, the state physician-patient privilege, medical records statutes
and finally specific state laws on HIV antibody testing. It will be
shown that many of the laws are very narrow in scope and that the
right of privacy is subject to conflicting public health and public
policy interests. No single law offers the protection desired by a
person infected with the HIV; rather, a combination of laws or doctrines
must be used.

II. AIDS AND HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS ANTIBODY TESTING
The illness called Acquired Immune Deficiency S)mdrome, abbreviated
AIDS, is the end stage of the infection by the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, HIV (formerly known as Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type III,
HTLV III and Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus, LAV or a combination
of those terms: HTLV/LAV). The syndrome is a set of symptoms that
occur together and indicate a poorly functioning immune system. The
virus invades certain white blood cells, the T-Lymphocytes, particu-
larly the T-helper cells, which are an integral part of the human
immune system. When these cells are damaged, the body cannot fight
infection and becomes highly susceptible to viruses, protozoa, bacteria,
parasites and fungi.
When the HIV attacks the white blood cells, the body produces
antibodies. The infected person is asymptcwiatic but is considered
to be capable of infecting others. A person may be without sympt<ms
of disease for years. Another stage of HIV infection is the AIDS-Related
Complex or ARC. The person may have such health complaints as loss of
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appetite, swollen lymph nodes or tiredness. Because these symptoms
may be indicative of other diseases, persons exhibiting them require
further medical testing.
Some infected individuals may proceed from ARC to AIDS,
others may never have ARC, but instead develop AIDS. The Center
for Disease Control (C.D.C.) definition of AIDS is HIV exposure

associated with an immune deficiency in a person not otherwise at
risk (for example, not taking drugs to suppress the immune system
as an organ transplant donee) and the presence of an opportunistic
infection, Kaposi's sarcoma , dementia, wasting illness, or non-
3Hodgkm's lymphcana. Typical opportunistic infections include
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (caused by a protozoan), cryptococcal
meningitis (fungus), central nervous system toxoplasmosis (protozoan),
cytomegalorius (a herpes family virus causes severe diarrhea),
candidiasis or thrush (caused by a fungus), tuberculosis (caused by
bacteria) and cryptosporidosis, also causing severe diarrhea (proto-
zoan disease). Besides invading the ^diite blood cells, the HIV may
invade the brain and nerve cells causing neurological impairments
such as dementia. The infected person becomes weaker and weaker and
eventually succumbs to one of the infections or to cancer such as
Kaposi's sarcoma . Technically it could be said that the person does
not die of AIDS or of HIV infection, but with AIDS as the result of
another disease that overwhelms the body,
AIDS is believed to have surfaced in Africa in the 1960's.
It occurred in the United States in scattered cases of Pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia in the 1970' s but was not recognized as a separate
disease. Not until 1981 and 1982, when physicians reported an unusual
number of incidences of Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, Kaposi's
sarcoma and generalized lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph nodes) in
otherwise healthy young men to the CJ>P^ was the disease recognized.
The majority of the early cases involved young homosexual and bisexual

men. The disease was suspected of being viral and transmitted sexually.
Then it appeared in intravenous (IV) drug users and finally hemophiliacs
thereby establishing a blood connection to transmission.
In 1984, researchers in France and the United States isolated
the virus, HIV, believed to cause AIDS, Although the HIV has been
isolated in semen, blood, and other body fluids, transmission of the
infection is primarily through sexual contact, the sharing of needles
and, now less frequently, transfusions of infected blood or blood
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components. Casual contact does not spread the virus. There is no
evidence of transmission of HIV to family members who live with an
individual who has AIDS.
A brecikdown of the AIDS cases shows the sufferers to be primarily
sexually active homosexual or bisexual men (73 percent), followed by
present or past intravenous drug users (17 percent), recipients of
blood transfusions (2 percent), hemophiliacs (1 percent) and infants
born to infected mothers (1 percent). To date approximately 36,000
cases of AIDS have been reported to the C.D,C, The mortality rate
(ratio of dead to total cases) is about fifty percent (half the reported
persons have died) and the fatality rate (final outcome of the disease)
is 100 percent. Estimates are that the number of cases doubles every
eleven months. For every reported AIDS case, there are an estimated
fifty to one hundred infected, asymptomatic carriers. Although
scientists do not know how many of these carriers will develop AIDS,
the best guesses are that five to twenty percent will develop AIDS
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and an additional twenty-five percent will develop ARC. There is no

vaccine against HIV and there is no cure for AIDS.
The first license to manufacture a test kit to test blood for
the HIV (then HTLV III) antibodies was issued in 1985. Because the
presence of antibodies indicates exposure to the antigen, in this
case HIV, the nation's blood services began to use the new test to
screen the blood supply. Use of the HIV antibody test expanded frcan
the blood services and is now available to individuals through state
health departments, sexually transmitted disease clinics, doctors*
offices, military testing facilities and so-called **alternative" test
sites. Two types of tests are available. ELISA, the Enzyme-Linked
Immunosorbent Assay, is of more widespread use. It is sensitive enough
to detect the antibodies, but its lower specificity gives it a high rate
of false positives. If the first ELISA test is positive, a confirmative
ELISA test is run a second time. If it is still positive, then a
second type of test, the Western blot is done. Western blot is
more specific than ELISA for antibodies but it is more expensive and
complicated to run. Unfortunately, the error rates or the reliability
of the ELISA test varies from laboratory to laboratory. The
interpretation of the Western blot also can v^ry. That test is
designed so that the HIV antibodies show a pattern of stripes or
bands. Some laboratories considered the presence of one band as a
positive result. The American Red Cross requires three bands.
Obviously there is tremendous concern by health authorities about
false positives because increased testing affects quality control by
overburdening laboratories or encouraging the rise of poorly supervised

laboratories. ©f equal concern is the false negative result.
Once an individual is infected with HIV, it may take the body up to
twelve weeks to develop antibodies. A test taken during this period
could result in a negative finding that was false. The individual
would then incorrectly conclude that he or she was not infected.
This person could unwittingly infect others.
The meaning of a positive test result is quite limited. The
seropositive individual has been exf)osed to HIV and probably is a
carrier of the virus. More important is what the test does not mean.
It is not diagnostic: it does not test for AIDS. It cannot predict
that the individual will develop ARC or AIDS. It does not count
the number of T-lymphocytes or evaluate the body's immune response;
other tests are available for these purposes. Yet in the public's
mind, HIV seropositivity is the same as AIDS. The fear of AIDS
because it is a new, fatal disease, and the stigma attached to it
because the majority of cases have occurred in hc»nosexual men and
I.V. drug users, have given grave consequences to HIV antibody testing.
Public fears have generated a political response to HIV
antibody testing. The Reagan administration has proposed **routine"
testing for marriage license applicants, prisoners, and people tested
at venereal disease clinics or drug treatment centers. The Department
of Defense requires mandatory testing of military recruits and of
military members. Recently, immigrants to the United States were
made subject to mandatory testing. Testing raises the question of
whether it should be voluntary or mandatory; who should be tested;

how often should the test be performed; whether the testing should be
anonymous; whether the names of the seropositive should be reported to
public health officials; and whether the names of sexual or drug contacts
should be solicited and then traced. Mindful of these issues and the
medical aspects of AIDS, the Surgeon General of the United States has taken
• • 12the position that compulsory testing is unnecessary. The American
Medical Association rejected the Reagan administration's call for
expanded routing testing and urged instead widespread voluntary
13testing and counselling. Columnists have suggested that politicians
are using the AIDS epidemic to discriminate against homosexuals or
that the proposed testing simply is illogical: for example, because
the disease is sexually transmitted it is very underinclusive to test
14
only marriage applicants instead of all sexually active people.
As election year 1988 approaches, few politicians will refrain from
taking a position on testing and its impact on privacy.
A positive HIV antibody test result can be personally devastating;
the individual must face the fact of life long infection and the potential
of developing AIDS. If the results are not kept in confidence the
individual may be subject to the same discrimination as the person
who has AIDS: loss of employment, insurability, housing and friends.
In addition, public health officials fear that breaches of confidentiality
will cause the infected, or those who suspect they are infected to
avoid testing and health care, thereby frustrating epidemiologic

studies and endangering others. They reccMnmended that state legislatures
pass laws ensuring confidentiality, punishing unauthorized disclosure
and prohibiting discrimination against not only persons with AIDS
but persons with positive HIV antibody test results.
Next to the inconclusive meaning of a positive HIV antibody
test result, the most troubling aspect of the test is confidentiality.
The majority of individuals would not want the f)ositive antibody
status disclosed to the public or even to an employer or insurance
company. Controlling this data is difficult because the testing is
not centralized. Blood banks test as do private clinics and public
health service (state and federal) clinics. Hospitals perform tests.
Antibody status may be found in health records, on blood donor
deferral lists, on laboratory reports or in experimental data.
This information, status and possibly names (some testing is anonymous)
is held privately, or by state or federal agencies. State laws can
change, so conceivably a state that at one date required no reporting,
even of AIDS could later require reporting of the names of persons
who are positive for HIV antibodies.
Just as the HIV antibody testing is diverse, so are the laws
protecting privacy. Both federal and state law may provide some
protection, but as will be discussed, there are severe limits to the
amount of coverage and protection. Also useful are the laws concerning
the physician-patient testimonial privilege and laws governing medical
records. The long standing deference to public health laws by the

courts make most laws inadequate to protect confidentiality in HIV
testing. When breaches of confidentiality occur, there are few
remedies. Damages cannot restore confidentiality.
III. FEDERAL LAW
Particular Statutes
When HIV antibody status is contained in medical records held
by the federal government, some protection against disclosure is
afforded by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and by the
18
Privacy Act of 1974. The FOIA generally allows public access to
government held information. Subsection (b)(6) of the Act exempts
personnel and medical records along with similar files "the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."
This should prevent parties outside the government from seeking HIV
antibody status by requesting an individual's medical or personnel
record. The Privacy Act prohibits disclosure of any record in a
system of records without the consent of the person to whom the
record pertains. This Act contains two exceptions. One is the
19
"routine use" and the other is "compelling circumstances."
Basically routing use allows disclosure "for a purpose which is
c<Mipatible with the purpose for which ^the information^ was
20
collected. The individual's consent is not required for this
type of disclosure. Subsection (8) allows disclosure "to a person
pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the

health and safety of an individual ... ", Consent prior to disclosure
is not required but notification of the disclosure to the individual's
last known address is required. It is not difficult to imagine a
third party presenting "cc»npelling circumstances" in order to obtain an
individual's HIV antibody status. If it can be said that in spite of
the exceptions the Privacy Act does protect confidentiality, it does so only
if the information is retrievable by the individual's name or identificaticm
number. This overlooks the capability of conputer searches that do not
21
require names or identifiers, yet can locate very sensitive information.
Other federal laws may provide some protection against
unauthorized disclosures of medical information. Under the regulations
22for the Protection of Human Research Subjects, entities doing
research with human subjects that is funded by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) are required to have an institutional
review board (IRB) whose function is to protect the rights and welfare
of the subjects. In order for the entity to obtain HHS approval, it
must follow the regulations which include a requirement for the IRB
to make certain, where appropriate, that there is adequate protection
23
of the subjects' privacy and the confidentiality of the data.
practice has shown that HHS is more concerned with the physical safety
of subjects than with their privacy. According to one author, IRB's
rarely have reviewed research protocols to prevent unwarranted
2Adisclosure of confidential information.
10

The Drug Abuse and Treatment Act of 1972 protects medical
25
records of persons undergoing treatment from disclosure. The
Secretary of Health and Human Services may authorize researchers
to protect the privacy of their subjects in studies or mental health
and alcohol and drugs. The researchers may withhold the names
and identifying characteristics of the subjects. Information
gathered by researchers funded by HHS for statistical and epidemo-
logical studies may be used only for the purpose for which it was
gathered, i.e. the study. Disclosure for other purposes requires
27
the subjects* consent. These federal laws concerning research
and drugs could be used to protect the HIV antibody status from disclosure
since a large number of I.V. drug users have the antibodies. The
protection is very narrow because the basic requirement is that the
individual must be involved in research or treatment to which the
laws apply. Therefore, the protection is more theoretical than
practical.
It seems unlikely that the federal laws will be of any use in
assuring that confidential or private information in medical records,
particularly HIV antibody status, is protected from disclosure.
There are either broad exceptions to nondisclosure or the number of
protected individuals will be so small that there will be little
impact.
U.S. Constitution
The right of privacy, or the right to be let alone as it has
28been called, is not one right but rather several related rights
11

supported by the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, particularly
the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The right of
privacy is situational or dependent on circumstances. It can be
applied to HIV antibody testing, but because the right is not
absolute, it does not provide strong protection.
First Amendment
The First Amendment protects freedcsn of speech, press, assembly
and petition. It has been applied to guarantee freedom of association
and in this context it protects one aspect of group members* privacy.
The ability of an association to function may depend on its success
in concealing the names of its members. A disclosure of the names
would subject members to hostility and would result in discouraging
their further association. State actions which infringe on this right
deny a liberty right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
29 30
Fourteenth Amendment, In N.A.A.C.F. v. Alabama , the Supreme
Court denied effect to a state court order requiring product of the
N.A.A.C.F. membership lists. The Court found that the state had no
compelling interest that would justify the deterrent effect on freedom
31
of association that disclosure would create. A slightly different
32
fact setting is found in Shelton v. Tucker which involved an
Arkansas statute requiring teachers to divulge their membership in all
organizations to which they had or were paying dues or making contri-
butions for the past five years as a condition of employment. Unlike
N.A.A.C.F. V. Alabama , the Court found that the state had an interest
in determining the fitness and conpetence of its teachers. However,
12

the required disclosure was so broad that is covered information
relevant to the states' interest and information irrelevant to it.
It impared the teachers* right of freedom of association. The Court
concluded that the statute did not provide that the information
given by the teachers be kept confidential; the school boards were
free to deal with the information as suited them; and that the record
showed there was a real danger of disclosure to third parties.
Although both N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama and She 1ton v. Tucker
appear to be old, settled law, they present an approach applicable
to one aspect of HIV antibody testing. Organizations exist that
promote the civil rights of persons with AIDS, and those who are HIV
antibody positive. The organization may be specific in its interests,
such as the National Association of Persons With AIDS, or it may
consider the protection of the rights of persons with AIDS to be one of
many issues, as in the case of a homosexual rights group. It is
conceivable that a state agency through a court order or through
legislation might attempt to obtain membership lists of organizations
for the purpose of learning antibody status. Equally plausible would
be the attempt to force an individual to divulge his or her associations
in the hope that a connection to either a homosexual rights or persons
with AIDS group would be discovered. Of particular importance is the
balancing of interests that the Supreme Court appears to have done
in both N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama and in She 1ton v. Tucker . The state
agency desiring membership information should be held to the standard
of a compelling interest because of the liberty interest in freedcan
13

of association. Because disclosure of membership is associated
with a positive antibody status, it would subject the members to
public hostility and have a chilling effect on further association
with the group.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has limited
its discussions on freedcMn of association to those groups whose
... 34
activities are covered by the First Amendment. This would
eliminate assocdations that are medical or social from protection.
A group whose members are predominately HIV antibody positive should
consider including swne tyf>e of political activity on its agenda to
ensure some type of constitutionally protected freedom of association
for its members.
Fourth and Fifth Amendments
Both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments provide privacy protection
for the individual who desires to keep particular types of information
froD the government. Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment protected
a seclusion interest rather than personal jnrivacy. As methods of
searches and seizures became more sophisticated and ceased to require
physical intrusion, the protection of the Fourth Amendment was expanded
by the Supreme Court. Katz v. United States , a case involving
electronic eavesdropping on a telephone booth, moved the Fourth
Amendment's protection toward confidentiality of information. The
Court declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
37
places" and reasoned that Katz was entitled to assume that his
38
telephone call would not be broadcast. In effect this gave privacy
lA

protection to the telephone call and to the information (in this case
gambling information) conveyed in that call.
The Fourth Amendment's protection generally is limited to cri-
minal investigation. However, it has been used in a noncriminal setting.
Former President Nixon asserted, inter alia , that his right to privacy
39had been violated in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services .
The Supreme Court conceded that Nixon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his purely personal papers but ultimately ruled against
him on other issues. This particular case will be discussed later as it
relates to disclosure of information, but it is a rare instance of the
Supreme Court recognizing a Fourth Amendment right of privacy in a
noncriminal case.
It is doubtful that the Fourth Amendment's coverage will be
expanded to include a generalized right of privacy. Therefore its appli-
cation to HIV antibody testing is limited. An individual would need to
possess information of his or her antibody status in such a manner that a
reasonable expectation of privacy would exist. For example, if a home
testing kit for the presence of HIV were to be developed (one might specu-
late on the possibility of testing for scmiething other than antibodies
that would indicate exposure to HIV; advances in technology made home
testing for pregnancy possible and there is no reason to assume that as
more is known about the HIV, simpler screening tests cannot be developed),
the results of that test might fall under the expectation of privacy.
On a more practical level, the private telephone conversation that
reveals HIV antibody status should receive the same protection as
15

Katz telephone call. The difficulty is that the conversation must
be heard by an agent of the government. The Fourth Amendment does
not protect information that is given to private individuals, even
40if they are informants for the government.
If anything, the Fifth Amendment's protection of privacy is more
limited than that of the Fourth Amendment. It allows the individual
to refuse to divulge to the government incriminating information
about himself or herself. Being HIV antibody positive is not a crime,
just as being a drug addict is not a crime. Given a hypothetical
law which made unprotected sexual intercourse by a HIV carrier a
crime, that person would be most reluctant to disclose his or her
41
antibody status to criminal investigators if he or she were a carrier.
The conclusion to be drawn fran this discussion of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments as they relate to the right of privacy and HIV
antibody testing is that they provide little protection. They are
of scxne use in the unusual circumstance that involves a criminal
investigation. Fourth Amendment protection could be asserted as an
alternative argument to prevent disclosure to the government; however,
a litigant would be unwise to place must reliance on it.
Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment provides two avenues of attack on laws
that impinge on the privacy of those who are HIV antibody positive.
The first, although not strictly involving privacy, is the guarantee
of equal protection. The second is substantive due process. In using
the former, one argues that the particular law discrimination against
16

a group. The latter argument contends that the right of privacy
has been denied.
Equal protection requires the state to have a defensible reason
for classifying persons and treating them differently from those who
are not members of the class. Equal protection allows several levels
of judicial review. At the most tolerant level, the mere rationality
42
test, the state's means must be rationally related to the desired end.
Courts use minimal scrutiny of the challenged law. Judicial intervention
is rare and deference to the state's purpose is high. Under minimal
scrutiny, it is nearly impossible for a plaintiff to persuade
a court to declare a state's law unconstitutional because, with rare
exception, there is some rational connection between the law and the
state's intent or goal.
At the other end of the spectrim is the strict scrutiny standard.
It is used where there is a suspect classification that impairs a
43fundamental right (such as voting or interstate travel). Under the
strict scrutiny standard, the state is required to show that the
classification is necessary to satisfy a ccwipelling state interest.
At this level of scrutiny, it is very difficult for a state to sustain
that burden.
Equal protection law is not an all or nothing proposition. Under
minimal scrutiny the state's law was upheld. Under strict scrutiny, the
state lost. A third test, heightened scrutiny was developed. It was
44 45
used for sensitive classifications like alienage and illegitimacy,




such as education. Under heightened scrutiny, the state must show
a direct, substantial interest between the classification and the
achievement of the state objective. The determination of what constitutes
s sensitive classification, uses the same factors as the suspect
classification. They are few in nianber; a history of discrimination,
. . 1 49political powerlessness
, stigmatization and immutability. No one
characteristic is determinative of a suspect classification, but if
the combination of the factors shows the group to be a ''discrete and
insular" minority, their special treatment by the courts is allowed.
Equal protection arguments can be applied to laws affecting
those persons with positive HIV antibody status by looking at the
membership of the class and by reviewing the importance of the state's
interests. One approach to the status of the group has been an analysis
of the largest group of seropositive individuals — hOTiosexuals.
Eloquent argument has been made that hcMnosexuality deserves the status
of suspect classification. It is beyond cavil that hcanosexuals
have a long history (centuries old) of discrimination and stigmatization.
Yet the Supreme Court has not conferred the status of suspect or sensitive
classification on homosexuals and has upheld state laws prohibiting
52
homosexual sodany, most notably in Bowers v. Hardwick . It seems
unlikely that courts will confer a special status on homosexuality;
therefore an equal protection attack on this basis will not be successful.
Another look at the membership of the positive HIV antibody group
shows it to be made of members of groups that enjoy judicially favored
status. A great portion are Black people and Hispanic p>eople. Race
18

and national origin are suspect classifications. Alienage is at least
a sensitive classification. There is a potential argument that laws
which discriminate against persons who are HIV antibody positive are
also discriminatory against Blacks and Hispanics. Therefore the
group is deserving of sensitive classification status at a minimum.
Additionally, the stigmatization of HIV carriers, the immutability
or inability of them to control their •'membership" in the groups (at
least up until the time that scientists discovered the cause of AIDS
and how it is transmitted) »defines them as a discrete and insular
minority. Although it can be argued that any lifelong infection
such as herpes simplex II (also known as genital herpes) or hepatitis B
carriers might be called a sensitive classification, the HIV carriers
clearly are distinguishable because of the public fear and loathing and mortalitj
associated with AIDS.
Assuming, arguendo , that positive HIV antibody status is a
sensitive classification, the next step is an analysis of the state's
interest in legislation that discriminates against the class. Colorado
statute requires the reporting by name and address not only of those
53
persons with AIDS, but also those infected with HIV. A helpful
analysis of the state's interest in the reporting requirement is in
54
the Cardozo Law Review. The four stated purposes of the law
(1) to alert health agencies to the presence of persons
likely to be infected with a highly dangerous virus;
(2) to allow health agencies to ensure that the infected
were counselled as to the meaning of the antibody
19

test and how to prevent transmission of the virus;
(3) to allow health agencies to monitor the occurance
and spread of infection of the virus within the
state; and
(4) to allow health agencies to contact the infected
when specific anti-viral treatment becomes available
were discussed to discover whether the requirement of reporting names
logically achieved the concededly important state interest of reducing
incidence of infection and disease. Under the author's analysis, the
state failed to justify keeping a list of names. The interest in
counselling could be accomplished better by tying it to the testing.
That is, if counselling is part of the testing, once a person is
tested and counselled, the state had no further interest in counselling.
The interest in monitoring the spread and occurence of the infection,
is a matter of statistics, therefore names add nothing. Furthermore,
the transience of a ix>pulation and the reluctance of individuals to
be tested in Colorado make this particular goal difficult to achieve
with any degree of accuracy. Last, it is suggested that those people
who know they are infected with HIV have a strong personal interest
in knowing the latest medical and scientific discoveries about HIV
and AIDS. Most likely they would know of the existence of a cure
before the health authorities. A list of names will not assist health
authorities to inform the unregistered or, considering the mortality
rate of AIDS, those persons already dead when a cure is discovered.
In short the law did not further any aspect of Colorado health
20

authorities* AIDS related activities which could be acccMnplished
without requiring the identification of the group members.
The analysis of the Colorado law shows that by combining an
analysis of the group's characteristics and the means employed by
the state, under heightened scrutiny the requirement of names
does not establish a state's substantial interest when the goal
is the reducing of HIV infection. It is important not to confuse
the state's interest in public health which is always important
(and in the case of dangerous disease could be called substantial
or even compelling without eliciting much objection) with the means
by which the state would achieve its goal. Those means discriminate
against a group of people; the law officially creates a classification.
Where that group is persons with positive HIV antibody status,
heightened scrutiny should be the standard of review to determine
a denial of equal protection.
Substantive Due Process and the Right of Privacy
As discussed earlier, the right of privacy has developed in
piecemeal fashion. It existed in bits and pieces scattered over a
wide area of the law including property law (trespass) and tort law
(defamation, unauthorized use of photographic portrait in advertising
was an invasion of privacy). Although not recognized as a constitutional
right of privacy in the 1920' s, the Supreme Court overruled state court
decisions that interferred with the liberty rights of parents to
control the upbringing and education of their children.
21

In GriswQld v. Connecticut in 1965, the Supreme Court re-
cognized the constitutional right of privacy. A Connecticut statute
which forbade the use of and aiding and abetting the use of contra-
ception by married persons was found to be unconstitutional.
Although the justices did not agree on the precise source of the
right, the majority determined that there are guarantees emanating
fron the jjenumbra of the Bill of Rights and the Amendments to the
Constitution. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments
create zones of privacy and the right of marital privacy lies within
one of these zones*
The Supreme Court in subsequent cases expanded the right of
privacy. It was implied in the Fourteenth Amendment and included
personal rights that were fundamental. The state needed a compelling
58interest to interfere with individual conduct relating to marriage,
procreation, and contraception. The focus of these cases was
on personal decision making in the zones of privacy* and that aspect
of the right of privacy generally is called the right of autonany.
The right has been characterized as concerning intimate, personal
matters or family matters, but Bowers v« Hardwick upholding
a Georgia prohibition on private, consensual, hcMoosexual sodony,
evidences that not all intimate, private matters are protected.
Vfliereas the autonomy privacy right is limited to certain subjects,
there is a broader right of privacy which seeks to limit disclosure
of personal information. This right has been given several names:
the right of confidentiality, the interest in avoiding disclosure
22

of personal matters and right of informational privacy. For the sake
of simplicity, it will be referred to as the right of informational
privacy.
This right has its roots in the tort law of defamation which pro-
tected the individual's reputation against defamation by slander (oral)
and libel (written) falsities. The main defense against defamation
is the truth of the words spoken or written so the disclosure of highly
objectionable but true facts was not actionable. But it is not unreason-
able for an individual to desire to limit the information that others
have about him or her, because even the truth can be quite damaging.
The tort of invasion of privacy is of some assistance, but it is limited
6*5
to the disclosure of highly offensive and objectionable facts.
The issue of whether the individual had a liberty interest in
his reputation came before the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis . The
plaintiff had been arrested for shoplifting but the charge was dismissed.
Nonetheless, his name and picture were included in a flyer depicting
active shoplifters that was circulated by the police to local merchants.
The plaintiff asserted that the resulting damage to this reputation was
a deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law. The
Supreme Court disagreed and found that reputation alone was neither a
liberty nor property interest. In distinguishing sane prior rulings, the
court indicated that an interest more tangible than reputation was needed.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the circulated flyer did not




information about oneself was not recognized in Paul v. Davis *
The next year, the Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that
there was an interest in avoiding the disclosure of highly personal
information, but this interest was not a fundamental right. The case
was Whalen v. Roe which involved a New York law that required a
copy of a physician's prescription for the New York equivalent of
the federal Schedule II dangerous drugs be submitted to the
State Health Department. The prescription form contained information
about the identification of the patient, prescribing physician,
dispensing pharmacist, the drug, the dosage and the patient's age
and address. The forms were retained for five years and then
destroyed. Public disclosure of the patients* names was prohibited
and access to the information was restricted to a small number of
health department employees.
The plaintiffs who were physicians contended that the statute violated
two areas of privacy. The first was their interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters. The second was their right of autonomy — their
independence in making important decisions about their health. They
were concerned that disclosure of their identities would cause them
to be labeled drug users and would damage their reputations*
Therefore they would be reluctant to use and the physicians reluctant
to prescribe the drugs thereby affecting their decision to seek
69
treatment.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The safeguards were adequate to
prevent unwarranted disclosure and, in fact, the record did not
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support that disclosure had occurred. Any court ordered disclosure
(which could arise if a patient or physician was accused of violating
the statute) could be judicially supervised to prevent damage to
reputation. The disclosure of the prescription form to the health
department was similar to the disclosures required by the modem
practice of medicine. The requirement for the information was not
automatically an invasion of privacy.
The opinion stated that "^t^he right to collect and use such
data for public purposes is typically acccmpanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.**
The importance of the safeguards is clear* because the Supreme Court
would not give an opinion on questions involving a system that lacked
precautions against unwarranted disclosure.
What the Supreme Court did was to balance the state's interest
in protecting the public health and in preventing drug abuse against
the patients* right of informational privacy. This balancing test
indicates that informational privacy is an important right requiring
heightened scrutiny. If it were not, then the Supreme Court would
72
have used a minimal scrutiny test, and its 'discussion of the
safeguards against disclosure would have been unnecessary.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the right of informational
privacy as an important but not fundamental right is affirmed in
73
Nixon V. Administrator of General Services . In that case, the
former president made several constitutional challenges against the




assertion that the act violated his right of privacy. The Act
required all of the presidential papers and recordings be sutmitted
to archivists for screening. Purely personal, private materials
would be returned to Nixon. The Supreme Court decided that the
district court properly balanced the public's interest in preserving the
materials on official duties against the invasion of privacy that a
screening would cause, and it found that screening the materials was a
reasonable response to the mingling of a small amount of personal
material with a vastly larger amount of nonprivate material.
The Supreme Court agreed that the Act was not an unconstitutional
violation of Mr. Nixon's right of privacy. It cited Whalen for the
proposition that the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters was one element of privacy. Mr. Nixon did not give up
all expectation of privacy when he became President, but the Supreme
Court found that this expectation applied to very little of the
presidential materials. The informational privacy must be balanced
against the state's interest. The opinion states that
the merit of the appellate 's claim of invasion of his
privacy cannot be considered in the abstract; rather,
the claim must be considered in light of the specific
provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be
weighed against the public interest in subjecting




Although there are scwie differences between the Vfhalen and
Nixon cases — in Whalen personal information was to be submitted
to the state for retention whereas in Nixon personal materials
would be screened out and returned — both cases recognized the
individual's right of informational privacy as an important interest
requiring heightened scrutiny for review. The weakness of the cases
is that they give little foundation for this new right. This has
Ilk
allowed the federal circuit courts to apply either Paul v. Davis
reasoning or Whalen v. Roe to plaintiffs* assertions that their
right of informational privacy has been impaired.
The Courts of Appeals
Four cases from the 1980* s are of particular interest for
assessing the treatment of informational privacy. Three of the cases
involve the recognition by three circuits of medical information as
part of informational privacy. A fourth case shows the limits of
the right.
78
Both General Motors Corporation v. Director N.I.O.S.H. and
79 .
.
U.S. V. Westmghouse concern investigations by the National
Institute of Safety and Health into occupational disease. The
corporate employer became the '•champion" of its workers* right of
privacy in an effort to refuse access to medical records. In General
Motors V. Director N.I.O.S.H. , the Director issued a subpoena for medical
records in connection with research into skin diseases of employees
who worked in the *Vet rubber process.** The records in question were those
of A90 employees (out of 70A) who did not execute consent to release
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the records. General Motors was concerned about releasing information
which employees had given to the plant physician in confidence.
N.I.O.S.H, wanted names so that contact could be made with the
employees to confirm or refute suspected cases of occupational
skin disease. The Sixth Circuit cited Whalen for balancing the
individuals* privacy interests against the public agency's statutory
right of access. The court concluded that "with proper security
administration, the Institute should be able to complete comprehen-
sive health hazard evaluation ... without jeopardizing the
constitutional rights of the individuals involved.** (The case was
remanded to the district court to formulate and implement security
. 80
measures).
In Westinghouse N.I.O.S.H, was investigating allergic reactions
to and the effect on the respiratory system of a chemical called HHPA
(hexahydrophthalic anhydride). Westinghouse wanted the employees first to
consent to the release of their medical records and the government
to provide written assurance that the contents of the records would
not be released to third parties. N.I.O.S.H, would agree only to
removing the employees* names and addresses before publishing the
data. The Third Circuit found that medical records were well within
the type of materials entitled to informational privacy protection
and voted that far more personal information was requested by the
81
government than had been requested in Whalen , The court listed
seven it«as to be considered in balancing the government's interest
in occupational safety and health and the right of privacy; 1) the type
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of record, 2) the information contained in it, 3) the potential for
harm in subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, A) the injury from
disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated,
5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure,
6) the degree of need for access, and 7) the existence of statutory,
articulated public policy or other recognizatble public interest in
82
access to the information. Taking these factors into account the
government's substantial interest in occupational safety and health
and the public's interest in N.I.O.S.H. investigations justified
83
the minimal intrusion into the medical records.
84
Farnsworth v. Procter and Gamble Co. was a products liability
suit involving the toxic shock S3mdronie. The plaintiff intended to
introduce into evidence a C.D.C. study on toxic shock syndrome.
Defendant wanted the names and addresses of the women who participated
in the study in hope that it could discredit the study. The information
given to the C.D.C. was highly personal and included medical histories
and sexual practices. The C.D.C. feared that disclosure of the
participants' identities and the potentially embarrassing information
would inhibit future studies (C.D.C. asked tjie women for consent to
release the information and 32 agreed). The Eleventh Circuit found that
the C.D.C. 's interest in keeping the participants' names confidential
85
outweighed the discovery interests of Proctor and Gamble. The court
noted with approval what amounts to a public policy interest! the
need to encourage voluntary reporting to C.D.C. by participants in
86
its studies. This agreement — the need for voluntary reporting —
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was not discussed in either General Motors or Westinghouse , There
may have been an assumption that the workers felt free to talk to
the plant physician or that any disclosure would not affect this
conununication (however, General Motors , the Sixth Circuit noted
87that there is no federal physician-patient testimonial privilege).
Although the federal courts seem to accept the interest in
information privacy of medical records, they have not extended it




chose to apply the reasoning of Paul v. Davis instead
of Whalen. The case concerned the post-adjudication use of
COTipiled social histories of juveniles in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.
The court held that although the Constitution protects several
specific aspects of privacy, particularly those extremely intimate
matters related to the autonomy right, there is no general right to
89
nondisclosure of private information. The social histories were
"indistinguishable" from the shoplifter flyer in Paul v. Davis .
Furthermore, the court ruled that neither Whalen nor Nixon overruled
90
Paul V. Davis .
From this discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
of privacy, there is no absolute right to nondisclosure of private
personal information. For the HIV carrier, this means the protection
is inadequate. There are some constitutional weapons that can be used
to challenge a state law requiring disclosure of the identities of individuals
who are HIV antibody seropositive. The most successful attack involves
a combined assertion of denials of equal protection and substantive
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due process. The HIV carriers are a sensitive classification thereby
requiring heightened scrutiny of the state's interest — its means
of achieving the goal, which in the HIV context will be public health.
Then the individual's interest in informational privacy is balanced
against the state's interest, using the seven factors of Westinghouse ,
An eighth factor from Farnsworth , the public policy in favor of
nondisclosure, must be part of the balancing. These factors are not
equal in weight. In order to complete the federal constitutional
picture, the judicial attitude toward public health and the arguments
on public policy must be examined.
Public Health
Preservation and protection of the public health is a state
interest with a long history of judicial deference. The Supreme Court
recognized public health as a legitimate subject of the state's police
91
power in 1905 in Jacobson v. Massachusetts . The case involved
mandatory vaccination. The court deferred to the legislature's deter-
mination that vaccination was the best method for preventing small
pox. It required only that the state's actions be reasonable. By
1922 the Supreme Court recognized preventive medicine in another
92
vaccination case, Zucht v. King . The Supreme Court determined that
schools could require vaccination as a prerequisite for attendance.
There was no requirement that there by an actual outbreak of small
pox to justify the state's action.
One should not infer that a court unquestioningly accepted the
93
state's expressed intent. The quarantine case of Jew Ho v, Williamson
in 1900 shows the Ninth Circuit accepting the medical evidence that
31

there were deaths from Bubonic plague in San Francisco and that
quarantine was an appropriate means of protection. However, the
court reviewed how the quarantine was enforced and found that the
quarantine was used to discriminate against Chinese people in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There was no medical basis for the manner in which
the quarantine was applied (skipping houses occupied by non-Oriental
people but quarantining only the Chinese in the same area).
A good faith, although possibly mistaken, disclosure by a
physician to a hotel owner of a contagious, dangerous disease —
syphilis — was allowed in the 1920 case of Simonsen v. Swenson .
This is another example of judicial deference to the interest in
protecting the public health.
These cases show a judicial restraint frcan intervening in
state actions. If there was a rational relation between the means
and the goals, the individual could lose his liberty (quarantine),
be subjected to unwanted medical treatment (vaccination) or suffer damage
to his reputation (disclosure of a loathsome disease). The deference
to public health was established long before major advances in
medicine and before the Supreme Court cases on privacy. One author
suggests that although the medical approach to disease has changed,
95
the human approach — fear — has not. There is a conflict between
medical and lay perceptions of a health problem, a conflict which places
96
pressure on public health authorities to act for inappropriate responses.
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Courts must evaluate the medical evidence in order to determine
the legality of the state's action. It has been suggested that the
analysis involves the two parts of a public health decision: risk
97
assessment and response. Risk assessment is a medical determination
of the severity of the disease and its manner of transmission. A
disease could be mild yet highly contagious like chicken jwx (in
children; in adults chicken pox is not mild>, or fatal but not
contagious like cancer. Medical knowledge decides the threat of
a disease to the public. The response or state action must be medically
sound. In forming a response to a public health problem, the state
should not choose one that is restrictive of individual rights if
98
a less restrictive, comparable response is available. Public
health protection is a legitimate state interest but calming the irrational
undifferentiated fears of the community is not a compelling, important
99
or legitimate state interest.
The cases of New York Association for Retarded Children v. Carey
and La Rocca v. Dalsheim are illustrative of a more active approach
by the courts to the public health problems of hepatitis B (which
is transmitted much like HIV) and AIDS. In Carey , the New York City
Board of Education attempted to exclude a group of retarded children
who were hepatitis B carriers from regular school classes. The action
was prompted by the considerable concern by parents and teachers over
a case of possible hepatitis in a public school (the disease was
hepatitis A, a different disease). The Board was aware that a
group of retarded children frcMn a state home were hepatitis B carriers.
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but it did not attempt to identify all the carriers, normal and retarded
102
children, m the school system. At trial the Board was unable to
demonstrate that the presence of the hepatitis B carriers in the
103
classroom created a health hazard. In fact, there was
considerable evidence on behalf of the children that isolating them
was detrimental to their development and would stigmatize them.
The Second Circuit looked carefully at the Board's risk assessment
and found it faulty. Because the medical evidence did not support
the Board's response to the perceived health problem, the response
Has invalid.
La Rocca involved inmate fear of AIDS in New York's Downstate
Correctional Facility. The majority of the prisoners came from New
York City, which had the largest number of persons with AIDS in the
United States, The court noted that the majority of persons with
AIDS were either homosexual or intravenous drug users and that hcmiosexual
activity (consensual and forcible) and drug use occurred in the prison.
In effect, Downstate was a "potentially high risk setting for AIDS."
At the time of trial, HIV had not been discovered, and the court
acknowledged the lack of medical knowledge on how AIDS was spread and
the relationship between contact and infection. Plaintiff prisoners
desired that all inmate movement into and out of the prison be halted
until all inmates and employees were examined for AIDS; then they
requested removal of all persons with AIDS from the prison to a hospital.
The court considered medical evidence of the communicability of the disease
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and the precautions employed within the prison. A considerable portion
of the opinion discusses the infection control measures used by persons
who care for or clean up after those prisoners diagnosed with AIDS (the
same measures as were used for hepatitis B). The court did not allow
itself to be influenced by the medical unknowns that surround AIDS
and fuel the prisoners' fears. Instead it directed that public
health literature be distributed to each inmate at the prison.
Relying on the medical evidence, the court denied the request
for an AIDS examination because none existed, and it denied the request
for removal of prisoners with AIDS because it was not medically
necessary. Based on the best medical information available on
AIDS, the court concluded that infection control measures were
appropriate for controlling contact between prisoners with AIDS and
108
the rest of the prison population. The court insinuated that
the prison authorities had a duty to prevent forcible homosexual
acts because those acts already were prohibited and the state had
109
a duty to provide a safe and humane place of confinement.
Carey and La Rocca are similar in that they concern a demand for a
public health response to two dangerous, contagepus diseases that share
transmission characteristics, a demand which was not based on sound
medical evidence and mhich was motivated by fear. The courts carefully
examined the medical evidence and made their own risk assessment.
Although there was concern for the individual rights of the people involved,
the courts would defer to the state's public health argument if
it was medically sound. In the context of public health
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and HIV testing, Carey and La Rocca indicate that the state's means of
protecting the public health will be given tremendous weight if they
are supported by medical evidence and not irrational fears.
Mandatory testing and disclosure to health authorities of the
identities of the seropositive individuals could be justified if the
HIV were proved transmittable through casual contact. In a case
involving medical necessity, the individual's rights will be overridden.
This argument is applicable to mandatory premarital HIV testing: there
is no medical necessity. The analogy to premarital syphilis testing
is useful. Only 21 states still require it. Other states repealed
their testing laws after studies showed that few cases of syphilis
were detected through the tests. Premarital testing for HIV
antibodies will detect few because young heterosexuals are not a
high risk group. It will overburden the laboratories that perform
the tests which may increase the risk of false positive tests.
Furthermore, the connection between premarital testing and stopping
the spread of infection is tenuous. A marriage license is not a
prerequisite for sexual intercourse. It is a matter of speculation
how many couples have been sexually active prior to marriage. If one
partner were infected with HIV, it is likely the other would be also
by the time they applied for the license. Fortunately the incidence
of HIV infection is low so the actual number of seropositive individuals
that mandatory testing would detect is small. Also in view of Loving
V. Virginia , it is doubtful that the positive test result would
constitute a compelling state interest that would justify the impairment
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of the right to marry.
At the present time, AIDS as defined by the C.D.D. is a reportable
disease in all states. Positive HIV antibody test results are reportable
112in Colorado, Montana, Arizona, Idaho, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
Only Colorado requires that identities be reported. As discussed earlier
the requirement for names does not assist Colorado health authorities
in their AIDS related activities. The purposes of the statute can be
achieved without names. Since there is no treatment or cure for or
vaccine against AIDS or HIV infection and the progression from asymptomatic
HIV infection to ARC or AIDS is unpredictable, the medical basis for the
Colorado reporting requirement is weak. Therefore, when the public
health interest is one of the factors either in the balancing test
between the individual's interest in informational privacy and the
state's interest or in the court's review of the state's interest in
discrimination against a sensitive classification of people, the court
will presume it to be valid unless it is medically unjustified.
Public Policy
The public policy against disclosure of private, personal
information is another factor to be considered in the heightened
scrutiny balancing test. Public policy reflects the reality that
most individuals will not reveal things about themselves that will
later cause them harm. It can also be used to encourage individuals
to undergo procedures that may benefit the state or the public that
otherwise would be too burdensome.
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As an analogy, the policy of disclosure of the natural parents*
identity in adoption is useful in forming a policy of nondisclosure
in HIV antibody testing. The natural parent may be an unwed mother,
and revelation of this fact at a later date could damage her
113
reputation, subject her to ridicule, or harm her future relationships*
It can be argued that fear of the consequences of disclosure would
cause the mother to terminate the pregnancy. Nondisclosure of
114
adoption records also frees the child from the stigma of illegitimacy.
A state that desires to encourage adoption will guarantee some type
of nondisclosure. Protection of the identity of the natural parent
is strictly a policy matter; it is not a right. There are several
states that have open adoption records, records that remain sealed
until the adoptee reaches his or her majority, or records that can
be opened for good cause.
A similar public policy applies to HIV antibody testing: the
state can encourage testing by guaranteeing confidentiality. The
U.S. Public Health Service practice is to maintain confidentiality
of the health records of infected persons. It acknowledges that
when reporting of infected individuals and tracing of their sexual
contacts is required, those who fear they are infected avoid testing
and medical treatment, i.e. ,"go underground." Blood services
also encourage nondisclosure of blood donor identities and information
given by the donors. Blood donor personal health histories are
important for determining the suitability of blood for transfusion.
Because false negatives occur in serological testing, the honesty
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and accuracy of the health history may indicate a reason for
screening out that donor's blood. Nondisclosure pranotes the safety
of the blood supply. It may also encourage a person with uninfected
blood to be a donor: many people would be deterred from donating
if they thought that the information on the health history might
affect their employment, reputation or personal relationships if it
were disclosed,
119 . .
The public policy argument m Farnsworth , that the partici-
pation in national studies requiring intimate information should be
encouraged, is valid in AIDS research and HIV antibody testing. A
tremendous need exists for research on AIDS* This research requires
subjects to discuss very personal matters that may involve sexual
practices illegal in many states and illegal drug use. The fear of
prosecution or of stigmatization as a hc»nosexual or drug addict can
deter needed participation and hamper research unless nondisclosure
is guaranteed. That same stigmatization and potential for discrimi-
nation in employment, housing and insurance might discourage the
ordinary person, high or low risk, fr«n being tested. To allay
these fears, many testing facilities do anonymous testing and the
identities are never Known.
IV . STATE LAW PROTECTION OF PRIVACY
State laws protect the individual's privacy in several ways
that affect HIV testing. A right of privacy may exist in the state's
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constitution or be recognized by statute. A physician-patient
testimonial privilege may exist, and there may be a statutory
requirement of nondisclosure of medical records. Althouth the
impact of AIDS and HIV antibody testing is relatively recent, a
few states have passed legislation that specifically guarantees
privacy for those with AIDS or HIV infection.
State Constitutional Right of Privacy
Alaska, California, Florida and Montana state constitutions
120guarantee a right of privacy. The extent of that right is a
bit uncertain euid the right is not absolute. In Falcon v. Alaska
121Public Offices Conmission , a physician-legislator challenged a
statute requiring him to divulge sources of inccane as violating the
right of privacy of his patients. The Supreme Court of Alaska
indicated that the standard for justifying the invasion of privacy
122depended on the type of privacy. The disclosure law did not
violate privacy when all it showed was that a person received medical
treatment. However, when there was something peculiar or characteristic
about the physician that revealed by implication the type of treatment
rendered, i.e. if the physician was a well-knowri cancer specialist or
sexual dysfunction therapist, disclosure of the physician's sources
of income, his patients' names, violated their privacy. The court
felt the statute could be amended to protect privacy by exempting
certain groups.
123
South Florida Blood Services v. Rasmussen is important because
it involved AIDS, the right of privacy of blood donors in Florida and
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public policy that favored voluntary blood donation. Plaintiff's
decedent was injured in an automobile collision and received blood
transfusions while in the hospital. He later developed AIDS and
died. The transfused blood was the suspected source of the AIDS.
In order to prove aggravated damages against the owner/driver of the
automobile » plaintiff sought the names and addresses of the donors
whose blood he received. South Florida Blood Service provided
the hospital with the blood and appealed the trial court's order to
produce the names. The case went to the District Court of Appeals
12^
which overturned the trial court's order and then to the Florida
Supreme Court which affirmed the District Court of Appeals decision.
The Supreme Court cited the District Court's opinion wherein it noted
that "AIDS is the modern day equivalent of leprosy. AIDS or a
suspicion of AIDS, can lead to discriniaation in enployment,
125
education, housing and even medical treatment.** The Supreme
Court stated that the public's response to AIDS made the protection
of the donor's privacy a critical matter and therefore disclosure
126
implicated **constitutionally protected privacy interests."
South Florida Blood Services established that the right of privacy
extended to medical information where disclosure would have devastating
consequences. It also allowed a third party to assert another's
right of privacy. This is particularly important in the area of
HIV testing where a testing facility or a blood bank has the
identifying information but might not be able to assert the physician-
patient privilege, as in Florida, where there is none. The judicial
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recognition of the disastrous effects on reputation and livelihood
that public knowledge of HIV infection has, militates toward a
policy argument against disclosure. South Florida Blood Services
is a recent case and it is difficult to predict how far it will be
applied. It could be limited to its facts and then would not protect
blood donor records if the blood service was accused of negligence,
or it might not apply to disclosure of donor records to a state
health agency when there were safeguards against subsequent
unauthorized disclosure.
The discouraging aspect of both Falcon and South Florida Blood
Service is the level of importance the courts placed on the state
constitutional right of privacy. The Alaska Supreme Court distin-
guished the federal right of privacy (autonomy) and the need for a
compelling state interest from the right of privacy in the Alaska
constitution to justify invasion of that right with the varying levels
128
of gratification required for the Alaska state right. The court
may have been following Whalen although the case was not cited. The
varying levels of justification in Alaska could correspond to the
fundamental right of autonomy, privacy and the lesser important
interest in informational privacy. In South Florida Blood Services
,
the District Appellate Court treated the state constitutional right
of privacy as an important interest and used the heightened scrutiny
129balancing test. The Florida Supreme Court cited Whalen and also
interpreted the right of privacy to be that of an interest in informa-
130
ticmal privacy. For the HIV infected f>erson seeking to protect
his or her right of privacy under a state constitution, if the privacy
kl

can be characterized as informational privacy rather than autonomy
privacy, the level of scrutiny will be the same as under the federal
constitutional right of privacy: heightened scrutiny. Therefore,
the state right does not give greater protection than the federal
right in preventing disclosure,
Physician-Patient Privilege
To a limited extent, the HIV seropositive individual may find
protection against unwarranted disclosures in the physician-
patient privilege which prevents forced disclosure in judicial
proceedings of confidential information. The limitations are many
because the privilege is testimonial and applies only in court
proceedings and related matters. It does not exist in all states.
For example, Florida does not have the physician-patient privilege,
131but It has the narrower psychotherapist-patient privilege. The
privilege is subject to statutory definition and may be interpreted
broadly to cover any information acquired by a physician in the course
of treating the patient or narrowly to mean only communication, thereby
132
excluding diagnosis and treatment.
Courts have not limited the term "physician"; information gathered
by the physician's agents, nurses or assistants is covered by the
privilege. Hospitals which hold patient records are allowed to assert
the privilege, and in Arizona they are required to assert it.
The California Supreme Court extended the meaning of physician to allow
a drug manufacturer to assert the physician-patient privilege where
confidential information was relayed by the physician to the manufacturer
^3

for the purpose of treating a patient who had an adverse reaction to
135
one of the manufacturer's products. As more experimental drugs
are developed to treat AIDS there may be many drug companies which
might be called upon to assert the physician-patient privilege in
order to protect patients' privacy.
It is clear that the physician-patient privilege will prevent
disclosure of HIV antibody status in judicial proceedings unless
the patient waives the privilege. It will not protect the patient
from disclosure in other contexts such as reports required by law
to public health authorities. There is a question whether a blood
1
"if.
service could assert the privilege. Blood services are supervised by
physicians. The blood donor who is HIV antibody positive usually
will be offered counselling by a staff member. Although the donor
may be unaware of the physician's role in the blood service, the
counselling he or she receives is part of the physician's supervisory
responsibility, and can be the basis of an argument favoring the
physician-patient privilege for blood services (through their medical
directors). Blood services hold great quantities of personal information
from both the HIV antibody test results and the personal health histories.
The needs for honest and accurate health histories and for encouragement
of voluntary blood donation, constitute a strong policy reason for
extending the privilege.
Medical Records
The confidentiality of medical records is controlled by atatute.
There is great variation among the statutes. For example, in Virginia
A4

the statute is very broad and exempts all medical records from
137
disclosure, whereas in North Carolina there is no general
guarantee of confidentiality but, instead, certain types of medical
records are confidential: records held by the Department of Human
138 139
Resources, clinical records of cancer patients, and records
140
concerning venereal diseases are exaaples. The importance of a
medical record statute to an individual who is HIV antibody positive
is that it prohibits unauthorized disclosures outside of judicial
proceedings. If the HIV antibody test results are not considered
to be medical records, the statute provides no protection. Head v.
141
Colloton illustrates a useful expanded meaning of medical record.
In that case a leukemia patient sought the name of a potential bone
marrow donor for a life saving bone marrow transplant. The potential
donor's name was in a state hospital's bone marrow transplant
registry despite her refusal to be a donor for anyone outside b€ her
family. The hospital refused to disclose the donor's identity
or contact her about the plaintiff. In reviewing the trial court's
order that the hospital notify the potential donor of the plaintiff's
need, the Iowa Supreme Court found, based on a physician-patient
relationship between physician and donor, the donor was a patient
and the record of tissue and blood typing was a medical record,
142
thereby exempt frcMn disclosure under the Iowa public records statute.
The case was not considered under the statute involving the physician-
patient privilege because that statute was narrowly construed and
143found to be inapplicable. Head v. Colloton has the potential
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of being the basis of a persuasive argument that a blood service's
donor deferral registry (the registry of donors whose blood was
rejected) or other records containing evidence of HIV antibody status
are medical records as an alternate position when the physician-patient
privilege cannot be used. In another context, the case could be used
to argue that test results at private testing facilities are medical
records and therefore are confidential. If a medical records statute
has exemptions for state hospital licensing inspectors or other state
144
agencies to review records for many purposes, the statute will not
prevent disclosure of HIV antibody status to the state, but would prevent
private individuals frcxn obtaining the records.
Specific HIV Antibody Testing Legislation
Other than the uncertain meaning for future health of a positive
HIV antibody test, the greatest fear of HIV antibody testing is the
unauthorized disclosure of the results or even the fact that the
test was performed. In response, few states have enacted legislation
to guarantee the confidentiality of the testing. The simplest
145
statute is from Massachusetts and requires written consent
from the subject for the test and for disclosure of the results. It
prohibits health care facilities, physicians and health care providers
from disclosing the identity of the test subject to anyone without
consent. The Maine statute provides that "no person may disclose
the results of a test for the presence of an antibody to HTLV-III,
a test that measures the HTLV-III antigen" except to the subject




or persons authorized by the subject to receive the inronnation.
Civil penalties for violation of the statute, in addition to actual
damages and court costs, are fines up to $1,000 for negligent
disclosure and up to $5,000 for willfull disclosure.
The Florida statute takes a very broad approach. Instead of
referring to a test for the HIV antibodies or HIV, the statute
147
addresses serologic tests. It does not specify the type of test.
One could conclude that it would cover such serologic tests as a
T-lymphocyte count, the hepatitis B surface antigen test, or any of
the serologic tests used in evaluating the body's iofflune system.
This type of statute should be particularly good for protecting the
confidentiality of tests of persons with HIV infection, ARC, or AIDS.
148 149
Both California and Wisconsin require written informed
consent for the HIV antibody test. They prohibit anyone frtan being
compelled to reveal the identity of any person who has been the
subject of an HIV antibody test. Civil and criminal penalties, in
addition to actual damages and court costs, are a maximum of $1,000
for negligent disclosure and a maximum of $5,000 for intentional
disclosure. The criminal penalty for disclosure that results in
bodily or psychological harm (and econcxnic harm in California) is
imprisonment, not to exceed one year in California, and nine months
in Wisconsin* or a fine not to exceed $10,000.
In addition to the protection of confidentiality of HIV antibody
testing, California specifically protects the confidentiality of AIDS
research records by prohibiting disclosure by anyone in possession of
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the record; by declaring the records to be exempt from discovery
and by prohibiting compelled disclosure of the records.
Similar protection is afforded under the New York Public Health
Act to protect the investigations and reports of the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Sjnidrome Institute of the department of health.
The best features of the statutes are, in addition to the
prohibition on unauthorized disclosure, the requirements for informed
consent, the criminal sanctions, the civil remedies and the protection
of research records. By delineating the circumstances under which
disclosure is allowed — to whom and for what purpose — and by
prescribing punishments for violations, the statutes provide the
widest protection of the right of privacy. From the viewpoint of
the person infected with HIV, the statutes could be improved. The
Massachusetts law is vague on sanctions for unauthorized disclosure
and makes reference to another statute on fraudulant practices. The
criminal sanctions in California and Wisconsin are not severe. The laws
allow disclosure to the public health services. If those public health
services are required to maintain the confidentiality of the information
then privacy is still protected. From a practical perspective, the
larger the number of individuals who have access to the information
or the greater the number of authorized disclosures, the risk of
breaches of privacy increases. The most useful statute is one that
strictly limits the persons authorized to receive the information;
that has the widest possible number of tests covered as confidential,
as is accomplished in Florida by designating serologic tests instead
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of HIV antibody tests; and that also limits the circumstances under
which the results may be disclosed. Allowances should be made for
research and epidemological studies* but release of names or other
types of identifying data must be prohibited.
V. CONCLUSION
AIDS is a fatal disease that has afflicted approximately
36,000 people in the United States. It is caused by the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, HIV> which has infected an additional
1,800,000 to 3,600,000 asymptomatic persons. It is uncertain how
many of these will develop the disease but the estimate is twenty
percent. The majority of the AIDS patients are homosexual and
bisexual men followed by intravenous drug users, neither group
is regarded as acceptable by the general public. The ctanbination
of fear of the disease and loathing of its sufferers by the public
has resulted in discriminatory action against both persons with AIDS
and persons infected with the HIV. The HIV antibody blood test which
was originally developed to screen the nation's blood supply is being
used to determine a person's antibody status. There are several
sources for the testing, many of which* such as blood banks* also have
highly personal information about the test subject. Some testing
facilities have names and addresses; other test anonymously.
The potential for unauthorized disclosure of personal, private
information including antibody status is of great concern because of
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the devastating effect it may have on the test subjects* insurability,
employment and personal relationships. Most of the federal laws designed
to protect privacy are of little use because they are applicable to
very limited circumstances ,such as drug treatment programs»or
prevent disclosure to the public while allowing full disclosure
within the government. A similar situation exists under the U.S.
Constitution. Specific types of privacy are protected, but there is
no right of privacy that is a fundamental right. The best approach
against a law that calls for the disclosure of identities and other
personal information of persons who have positive HIV antibody tests
is a combined equal protection and substantive due process argument.
The HIV infected people are a discrete and insular minority who are
stigmatized and discriminated against. Therefore ()ositive HIV
antibody status is a sensitive classification requiring the heightened
scrutiny level of review of any law that requires disclosure of the
identities of the class members. Also the required disclosures are
violations of the person's right to or important interest in
informational privacy which also requires heightened scrutiny.
Heightened scrutiny is a balancing test. Among the elements
that are considered are the manner in which the state proposes to
further its responsibility for public health and the public policy
against disclosure. Clearly case law shows a strong judicial deference
to public health. Courts must be urged to examine the basis of public
health decisions and require the state's method of achieving its goals
to be medically sound and the least instrusive as possible. A public
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policy of nondisclosure would encourage HIV infected people to be
tested and actually further the state's interests.
A few states have a constitutional right of privacy but state
judicial treatment of privacy of personal information is much like
the federal interpretations. It is an interest in informational
privacy and the heightened scrutiny balancing test is applied with
results ccxnparable to the federal cases. Other state laws that might
protect the HIV antibody seropositive individuals* privacy are the
physician-patient privilege (applicable to court proceedings and
related matters) and the medical records statute (applicable to
nonjudicial disclosures). Unfortunately these laws vary greatly from
state to state and do not exist in many states.
The best protection of informational privacy or confidentiality
as it is also called, is the state law that directly addresses HIV
antibody or antigen tests or serologic tests. It should limit
disclosure to the subject and his or her designated physician or
health care provider and prohibit other disclosures with the exception
of statistical data to public health agencies for epidemiological
studies. To be effective, the statute must contain civil and criminal
penalties for violations and these must be enforced. At present there
are only five states %rith this type of law. It is hoped that more
state legislatures will decide that the best way to stop the spread
of HIV infection is to encourage voluntary testing which can be
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